Normativity
-15%
portes grátis
Normativity
Epistemic and Practical
Way, Jonathan; McHugh, Conor; Whiting, Daniel
Oxford University Press
10/2017
304
Dura
Inglês
9780198758709
15 a 20 dias
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Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting: Introduction 1: Charity Anderson: Putting Fallibilism to Work 2: Jessica Brown: Pragmatic Approaches to Belief 3: Ulrike Heuer: The Relevance of the Wrong Kind of Reasons 4: David Hunter: Directives for Knowledge and Belief 5: Benjamin Kiesewetter: How Reasons are Sensitive to Available Evidence 6: Clayton Littlejohn: Evidence and its Limits 7: Errol Lord: The Explanatory Problem for Cognitivism about Practical Reason 8: Matthew McGrath: Pragmatic Encroachment: Its Problems are Your Problems! 9: Kate Nolfi: Why Only Evidential Considerations Can Justify Belief 10: Baron Reed: Practical Interests and Reasons for Belief 11: Andrew Reisner: Two Theses about the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity 12: Daniel Star: Reasoning with Reasons 13: Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen: Epistemic Instrumentalism, Permissibility, and Reasons for Belief
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Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting: Introduction 1: Charity Anderson: Putting Fallibilism to Work 2: Jessica Brown: Pragmatic Approaches to Belief 3: Ulrike Heuer: The Relevance of the Wrong Kind of Reasons 4: David Hunter: Directives for Knowledge and Belief 5: Benjamin Kiesewetter: How Reasons are Sensitive to Available Evidence 6: Clayton Littlejohn: Evidence and its Limits 7: Errol Lord: The Explanatory Problem for Cognitivism about Practical Reason 8: Matthew McGrath: Pragmatic Encroachment: Its Problems are Your Problems! 9: Kate Nolfi: Why Only Evidential Considerations Can Justify Belief 10: Baron Reed: Practical Interests and Reasons for Belief 11: Andrew Reisner: Two Theses about the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity 12: Daniel Star: Reasoning with Reasons 13: Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen: Epistemic Instrumentalism, Permissibility, and Reasons for Belief
Este título pertence ao(s) assunto(s) indicados(s). Para ver outros títulos clique no assunto desejado.
